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We study extinction in a commons problem in which agents have access to
capital markets. When the commons grows more quickly than the interest
rate, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endowments. In
one of these, welfare decreases as the resource becomes more abundant, a `re-
source curse'. As marginal extraction costs become constant, market access
instantly depletes the commons. Without markets - the classic environment
- equilibria are unique; extinction dates and welfare increase with the endow-
ment. When the endowment is either very abundant or very scarce, market
access improves welfare. As marginal costs of extraction from the commons
become constant, market access can reduce welfare if the subjective discount
rate exceeds the interest rate.
Key words: commons, capital markets, perfect foresight, extinction, re-
source curse, storage
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We analyse a dynamic commons problem in which agents have access to
capital markets in order to address two questions. First, how does capital
market access alter behaviour relative to that under intertemporal autarky?
Second, what are the welfare consequences of capital market access?
Theoretically, the question is a natural one: commons problems and cap-
ital markets, two basic objects of economic theory, have largely been studied
in isolation. The welfare properties of markets are well known; the commons
is an equally well known example of market failure. Understanding better
the interaction between these objects therefore seems promising.
Practically, all but the poorest agents in a contemporary commons prob-
lem are likely to have access to some form of capital market. To the extent
that this changes their behaviour, and that of the commons, it is therefore
important to understand the consequences of such access. To illustrate, we
mention two motivating examples.
The ¯rst owes to Tornell and Velasco (1992), who asked why capital could
often be observed °owing from poor countries, where it was scarce, to rich
ones.1 Noting that property rights may be weak in the poor country, they
modelled the extreme case, in which capital stocks were actually communal
endowments. Domestically, scarce capital earned a high return, but one
to which its `owners' had no greater rights than other members of society.
Capital could be extracted from this commons and sent abroad, endowing
private savings accounts which earned lower, but secure rates of return.2
In the second example, the commons is the atmosphere, with extraction
from it corresponding to its qualitative rather than quantitative degradation.
Interaction with capital markets occurs when producers earn pro¯ts in part
by emitting into the atmosphere, or borrow against a plan to emit in the
future.
While the ¯rst best in both cases may involve both strengthening property
rights and enabling capital market access, it may not always be feasible
to do both: strengthening property rights, which requires the extension of
1Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) argue that Africa is actually capital abundant when
human capital and domestic distortions are taken into account. They ¯nd that the ben-
e¯ts of ¯nancial integration to a typical non-OECD country are roughly equivalent to a
1% permanent increase in consumption, similar in magnitude to the costs of increased
volatility.
2In a companion paper, Tornell and Lane (1999) interest groups compete for gov-
ernment revenues. Thus, the formal sector earns a high return, but is converted into a
commons by government's coercive taxation power; the informal sector earns low but pri-
vate returns, escaping taxation. More exotically, Ross (2003) discusses `booty futures' in
the context of civil wars.
1governance, may be more di±cult than easing market access, which involves
loosening state controls.
Simple calculations support this concern. In terms of the ¯rst example,
we use the regulatory quality (RQ) and rule of law (RL) measures from
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) as rough proxies for liberalisation
and the strength of property rights. Countries with 1996 RQ scores, the ¯rst
year available, in the bottom half of the sample improved by an average of
0.03 to 2004, the last year available. For RL, the corresponding ¯gure is
-0.10, a deterioration.3
Thus, a poor country encouraged to undertake `Washington Consensus'
reforms, or a country su®ering from a collapse in governance or regulation,
may ¯nd itself in a transition period during which liberalised markets exist
alongside weak property rights.4 This may aid capital °ight from a country
with a high intrinsic return to capital.5
As to the second example, while technology developed since the Industrial
Revolution has allowed substantial increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas
stocks, attempts to regulate their emission are still in their infancy.
To understand these issues, Section 2 presents an in¯nite horizon model
that generalises those in Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane
(1999) in three ways. First, it allows extraction to be costly. Second, extrac-
tion rates are not restricted to be shares of the communal endowment. This
assumption, made for tractability's sake in the Tornell papers, rules out the
possibility of exhausting the commons. Third, the commons' growth rate
may be less than the interest rate, allowing consideration of non-renewable
communal resources.
As a ¯rst step towards strategic analysis, we consider a continuum of
identical, competitive agents who take the commons' extinction date as given.
In a model with two time periods, Rowat and Dutta (forthcoming) show that
equilibria with strategic agents who consider their e®ect on the extinction
date tend to competitive equilibria as the number of agents becomes large;
3As both measures have zero mean in every year, comparability is a question if global
averages vary over time. Kaufmann et al. (2005, x2.4) \cautiously" conclude that they
\do not have any evidence of any signi¯cant improvement in governance worldwide, and if
anything the evidence is suggestive of a deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions
such as regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption."
4Williamson (2000) provides a more detailed discussion of the use - and misuse - of the
term `Washington Consensus'. The widespread and ongoing looting in Iraq since 2003 is
a striking example of the latter case.
5Prasad, Rogo®, Wei, and Kose (2003) provides an empirical discussion of liberalisation.
One concern raised is that ¯nancial integration is associated with increased consumption
volatility for many developing countries.
2the strategic equilibria dominate the competitive ones.6
This, then, is the ¯rst paper to consider competitive extraction from the
commons in an in¯nite horizon model in which agents have access to capital
markets.
Our ¯rst main result, in Section 3, characterises equilibrium extinction
dates. A scarce communal endowment yields a unique, ¯nite extinction date.
At the opposite extreme, with an abundant endowment, the commons is
never depleted. In an intermediate range, two ¯nite extinction dates co-
exist alongside the non-extinction equilibrium. The ¯nite extinction dates
re°ect strategic complementarities in extraction. This reasoning only holds
when the commons grows more quickly than do privately saved resources.
Otherwise, there is no incentive to conserve the commons: agents will not
reduce their own extraction in response to delayed extinction.
The equilibria are Pareto ranked, with later extinction dates preferred.
As the communal endowment grows, the two ¯nite extinction dates converge
from opposite directions. The equilibrium with later extinction seems to suf-
fer from a form of resource curse, whereby increases in communal endowment
trigger a more intensive struggle for resources, reducing welfare.
Multiple equilibria are found elsewhere in the related literature. In Rowat
and Dutta (forthcoming), multiple extinction dates may occur with market
access under both strategic and competitive equilibrium concepts; under in-
tertemporal autarky, extinction dates are unique, as here.
The recent `storage' literature, which allows agents to save but not to
borrow, also exhibit multiple equilibria. In Kremer and Morcom (2000),
the ability to privately store communal resources at the opportunity cost
introduces strategic complementarities.7
Our second result is that, in the limit as marginal extraction costs be-
come constant, extinction becomes immediate. This result is consistent with
the `jump extinctions' of underground oil reserves, annual ¯shing quotas,
groundwater and currency pegs studied by Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant
6Tornell and Velasco (1992), on the other hand, ¯nd that increasing the number of
agents increases the societal growth rate. However, in addition to the restrictions men-
tioned above, Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) do not recognise
that even Markov perfect strategies will generally depend on agents' accumulated private
savings or debts. Instead, their agents condition behaviour only on the communal en-
dowment. Braguinsky and Myerson (2006) also consider strategic oligarchs who choose to
allocate assets between domestic and foreign holdings; theirs do not have access to capital
markets, nor is there a communal domestic capital stock to pillage.
7In Homans and Wilen (2005), ¯sh caught can either be sold immediately on the
premium fresh ¯sh market, or stored for the lower value frozen ¯sh market. They argue
that increased rents both induce entry and shorten the ¯shing season, thus causing more
¯sh to be sold on the inferior market.
3(2002). Considering competitive equilibria in a commons environment with
private storage (rather than full capital market access), they found sudden
depletions as average extraction costs became constant.8
These results make the restrictions on extraction in Tornell and Velasco
(1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) very restrictive: as their costless extrac-
tion implies constant marginal costs, instant extraction might be expected in
the absence of other assumptions. For example, while Long and Sorger (2006)
model linear extraction costs, they avoid extinction by granting agents utility
from the commons stock itself with in¯nite marginal utility as the stock goes
to zero. While their agents may only save they earn interest, unlike in the
storage literature, when so doing.
Section 4 characterises behaviour without market access. This intertem-
porally autarkic environment is the standard dynamic commons, and has
been extensively studied (q.v. Mirman, 1979; Levhari and Mirman, 1980;
Benhabib and Radner, 1992; Dutta and Sundaram, 1993; Dockner and Sorger,
1996; Sorger, 1998). As the commons is now the unique source of the con-
sumption good, agents may have more incentives to conserve it than they
would with market access.9 Extinction dates are unique: scarce commu-
nal endowments will be exhausted in ¯nite time; abundant ones will not be
exhausted. This owes to agents extracting as if they were solving a static
problem: not regarding themselves as responsible for the extinction date,
they view the problem as stationary until extinction. Altering the extinction
date does not, therefore, induce an extraction rate response.
Our third result, then, compares welfare under market access to that
under intertemporal autarky. To do so, we cannot adopt the usual approach
of dissipating all rents by free entry (q.v. Kremer and Morcom, 2000; Gaudet
et al., 2002). Instead, while we model a continuum of agents, we do not allow
its cardinality to increase. Our main ¯ndings are as follows.
When the communal endowment is abundant (so that it would not be ex-
tinguished under either market access or autarky), market access is preferred:
as agents only interact via the extinction date, setting it to in¯nity removes
their interaction. In this circumstance, market access replaces instantaneous
budget constraints with a single intertemporal one. When the resource is
8In Rowat and Dutta (forthcoming), the commons may survive even with constant, but
positive, marginal costs: agents may reach their glut points with only two consumption
periods.
9The `tragedy' is that overly rapid exploitation is still typical. Exceptions can be found
in Dutta and Sundaram (1993) in which, drawing on an idea from Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983), agents who de¯ne trigger strategies on the state variable exploit the resource
ine±ciently slowly. Benhabib and Radner (1992); Dockner and Sorger (1996); Sorger
(1998); Rowat (forthcoming) derive conditions under which equilibria are e±cient.
4scarce, market access introduces a strategic interaction, which may reduce
welfare.
Market access is also preferred to autarky when the endowment is scarce
and consumption utility is strongly concave, earning in¯nite disutility once
extinction occurs and consumption ceases. When consumption utility is less
concave, so that zero consumption earns ¯nite utility, market access is pre-
ferred to autarky as the resource becomes increasingly scarce: depletion oc-
curs quickly under both institutions, but market access allows consumption
bene¯ts long after the resource is exhausted.
In the limit case of constant marginal extraction costs, low interest rates
favour autarky. As mentioned above, market access allows `jump extinc-
tions', instantly depleting the communal endowment and endowing private
accounts. When the interest rate is low, though, impatient agents do not
bene¯t much from this. Autarky prevents such jump extinctions: extraction
beyond agents' static glut points is wasted. Thus, in the absence of strong
property rights, autarky provides a second best commitment technology to
preserve the high return commons.
When, on the other hand, marginal consumption utility becomes con-
stant, market access leads agents to instantly consume their whole endow-
ment, paying o® their accrued debts over time. While autarkic consumption
is constant until it depletes the commons, this cannot be a reason for pre-
ferring autarky: as there are no externalities on the consumption side of the
problem, consumption plans (conditional on intertemporal extraction) must
be better under market access. Autarky can outperform market access when
the communal endowment is abundant and agents' subjective discount rates
slightly exceed the interest rate.10 In these cases, the negative e®ect of mar-
ket access when the return to the commons exceeds that to secure private
savings - accelerated extinction of the commons - dominates its positive ef-
fect - superior intertemporal smoothing. As impatience grows, the extinction
date further reduces; this negative e®ect is outweighed by the positive e®ect
of the reduced present value of extraction costs.
In both of the limit cases mentioned, agents face only one smoothing prob-
lem. Otherwise, with strictly concave consumption utility and strictly con-
vex extraction costs, agents face both consumption and extraction smoothing
problems. Under market access, they have two instruments with which to
address these. Under autarky, with instantaneous consumption constrained
by instantaneous extraction, they only have one. The limit cases mentioned
are therefore the sorts of cases in which one would expect autarky to have
10In Rowat and Dutta (forthcoming), low interest rates relative to subjective discount
rates also favour autarky.
5the smallest disadvantages.
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix collects the main proofs.
2 The model
Time, indexed by t, runs continuously to in¯nity. Agents, indexed by i, are
identical, in¯nitesimal, and uniformly distributed on the unit interval. So-
ciety is communally endowed with a single consumption good, k (0).11 Its
instantaneous growth rate is the constant, a. At each instant, each agent ex-
tracts xi (t) ¸ 0 from the commons, and consumes ci (t) ¸ 0 of the consump-
tion good. Thus, xi (t) is the (¯nite) extraction rate at time t of in¯nitesimal
agent i.
Aggregate extraction is x(t) =
R
xi (t)di. Under symmetric extraction,
x(t) = xi (t). The aggregate extraction path, x(t), de¯nes the initial value
problem
_ k (t) = ak (t) ¡ x(t);k(0) > 0 (1)
whose solution is the path of the commons stock whenever k(t) > 0.
An extinction date is the smallest T ¸ 0; such that k(T) = 0: If limt!1 k(t)
> 0; then T = 1; which corresponds to non-extinction. Feasible extraction
cannot exceed the stock:
k (t) = 0 ) xi (t) = 0: (2)
For all t ¸ T, the commons stock is therefore absorbed at k (t) = 0, so that










Equation 3 describes the unique solution to initial value problem whenever
x(t) is continuous over [0;T) (Walter, 1998, p.28). Thus, aggregate extrac-
tion is admissible if x(t) is continuous over [0;T).12
















11Under the development or transition interpretation, the communal endowment may
owe to a change in governance or regulation that weakens property rights. Under the
environmental interpretation, technological progress may allow its extraction.
12Dockner, J¿rgenson, Long, and Sorger (2000, p. 40, De¯nition 3.1) use `feasible' in
place of `admissible'.
6where µ > 0 is an extraction cost parameter; ® > 0 ensures that consumption
utility is increasing and concave; ° > 0 makes extraction costs increasing and
convex.
The constraints facing agents maximising objective function 4 depend on
their institutional environment. Without capital markets, agents are under
intertemporal autarky and face instantaneous budget constraints: ci (t) ·
xi (t)8t 2 [0;1). They also face feasibility constraint 2.
Capital market access does not alter the feasibility constraint, but does
replace the instantaneous budget constraints with a single intertemporal bud-
get constraint: Z 1
0
e
¡rt [ci (t) ¡ xi (t)]dt · 0: (5)
Thus, xi (t) < ci (t) implies either borrowing against future extraction or
dissaving, depending on the sign of
R t
0 e¡rt [xi (¿) ¡ ci (¿)]d¿. The opposite
implies either repaying past consumption or saving for future consumption.
Borrowing and lending take place at the same exogenous rate, r. (When
a < r, the absence of property rights over the low yield resource is not so
problematic.) The exogeneity of r makes the model a partial equilibrium
model.13 Default is not permitted.
Unlike a budget constraint in a Walrasian economy, the present constraint
is not linear in the endogenously determined state variable, T in this case.
As instantaneous utility is unbounded, integral 4 may not converge as
t ! 1. To avoid comparisons of in¯nite valuations, we impose Uzawa
integrability conditions that ensure ¯nite valuations:
(1 ¡ ®)r < ½ < (1 + °)r: (U)
These ensure that, respectively, the utility of consumption is ¯nite, and that
the disutility of extraction is ¯nite when T = 1.14
Finally, a perfect foresight equilibrium is a triple of time paths (k;ci;xi) :
t ! <3
+ such that
1. agents choose consumption and extraction paths to maximise utility
subject to their budget and feasibility constraints;
2. the evolution of the commons stock is determined by the aggregate
extraction path.
13Cai and Treisman (2005) endogenously determines interest rates in a static model.
14See Dockner et al. (2000, pp. 62 - 63) for a discussion of optimality criteria when
valuations are in¯nite.
7A perfect foresight equilibrium is a special case of a rational expectations
equilibrium without private information or exogenous shocks. It is compet-
itive in the standard sense: although agents' aggregate behaviour in°uences
the economic environment, k (t) and T, they disregard their individual e®ects
on it. Thus, agents are extinction date takers.
3 Perfect foresight equilibria
Assuming that individuals can borrow and lend at rate r allows their problem
of determining extraction and consumption to be broken into two separate
problems:
1. the consumption-smoothing problem: choose ci(t) given total wealth
Xi(r) =
R 1
0 e¡rtxi(t)dt subject to constraint 5; and
2. the e®ort-smoothing problem: choose xi(t); given the extinction date
T and feasibility constraint, 2.
3.1 The consumption smoothing problem




























¡rtci (t)dt ¡ Xi(r)
¸
:
The ensuing Euler equation is standard:
ci (t) =





This is independent of a;° and µ. Its constant term is determined by the
constraint. Substitution into the objective function of equation 6 therefore





















The Uzawa ¯nite valuation condition for consumption is ½ > r(1 ¡ ®):
This is trivially satis¯ed if ® ¸ 1, so that consumption utility is more concave
than the logarithmic function. We note that







is the growth rate of consumption and ci(0) is chosen to satisfy (5):
ci(0) = (r ¡ gc)Xi(r): (9)
The Uzawa condition may therefore be expressed as gc < r: consumption
growth is less than the interest rate.
3.2 The e®ort smoothing problem



















subject to feasibility constraint 2.
When t < T, the ensuing Euler equation yields



















° and · is a positive constant. Evaluating this at t = 0 produces
xi (0) = · so that
xi (t) =
½
xi(0)egt for t < T
0 for t ¸ T
¾
: (11)














for n 6= 0 and T ¸ 0.
Thus, extraction is smooth until the extinction date, T: More signi¯cantly,
the problem of choosing an extraction path is reduced to a choice of xi(0).
Note also that the extraction plan is a function of ®: thus, full Fisher sep-
aration of extraction (production) and consumptions plans does not occur.
This is a consequence of ° > 0: extraction costs are borne as non-transferable
disutility.15
The Uzawa condition for extraction may therefore be expressed as g < r.
Notice that g = ¡®
°gc; thus, for r > ½; individuals extract early but
consume late. When r = ½, so that the interest rate equals the subjective
discount rate, g = gc = 0:
Notice also that an expression for extraction as a function of the commu-
nal endowment may now be written. By equations 3 and 11,












Thus, when g 6= a, extraction cannot be expressed as a linear function of the
endowment. Thus, the modelling in Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell
and Lane (1999) is restrictive.
3.3 Characterising equilibrium







where ¹ ´ (ºµ)
1
®+°.
Integrating over agents then produces the ¯rst fundamental equation: the







This equation gives us a monotone decreasing map T ! x(0).
15In the limit, as ° ! 0;xi (0) ceases to depend on ® by exploding to in¯nity. This will
also be demonstrated in Theorem 3.
10We now obtain the second fundamental equation: the impact of extraction
on the extinction date of the commons. As extinction occurs at the lowest







By equation 11 and integration over agents,





To simplify exposition, we assume here that a > r.16 With the Uzawa





















This equation gives us a map x(0) ! T; also monotone non-increasing. Here
a low x(0) guarantees the perpetuation of common property but a level higher
than (a ¡ g)k(0) results in extinction in ¯nite time.
Both maps are decreasing: individuals choose to extract more if they
believe that the commons will disappear soon; and higher extraction rates
speed up extinction. Such strategic complementarities are standard sources
of multiple equilibria (Vives, 2005).







and Ã¤ ´ limt!1 ª(t);Ã¤ ´ maxt ª(t).
Theorem 1. There exist 0 < kL · kH · 1 such that the following state-
ments hold when agents have access to capital markets. Given intervals
IL = [0;kL);IM = (kL;kH); and IH = (kH;1):
1. k(0) 2 IL implies unique equilibrium with ¯nite extinction;
16Theorem 2 explicitly considers the complementary case.
112. k(0) 2 IM implies three equilibria, one with non-extinction and two
with ¯nite extinction;
3. k(0) 2 IH implies unique equilibrium without extinction;
4. k(0) = kL = kH implies a unique equilibrium with non-extinction;
5. k(0) 2 fkL;kHg for kL 6= kH, implies a unique equilibrium with extinc-
tion, and a unique equilibrium with non-extinction.
Consistent with the usual ¯xed point arguments, we therefore generically
¯nd an odd number of equilibria.
The following lemmas are used to prove the Theorem:
Lemma 1. limt!0 ª(t) = 0.
Proof. As Qn(0) = 0; assessing ª(0) requires use of l'H^ opital's rule: dif-












Lemma 2. When the Uzawa extraction condition holds and a > g;0 < Ã¤ <
1.
Proof. By de¯nition, limt!1 Qn(t) = 1








The Uzawa extraction condition ensures that the numerator is strictly posi-
tive. When a > g, the denominator is as well, ensuring the results.
Lemma 3. An equilibrium with ¯nite extinction time T satis¯es ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ .
Proof. Equations A and I, with Qa¡g (T) =
k(0)
x(0), are satis¯ed in equilibrium.
The result follows by de¯nition 15.





17When n · 0 the limit is in¯nite.
12Proof. Assume that Ã¤ ·
k(0)













so that rearrangement produces
k (0)
x(0)




which satis¯es equation I. Thus, the conditions for equilibrium are satis¯ed.
By contrast, if Ã¤ >
k(0)
¹ , the ¯nal inequality above does not satisfy
equation I.
De¯ning kL ´ ¹Ã¤ and kH ´ ¹Ã¤ allows the Theorem to be proved. This
is done in the Appendix. Figure 1 illustrates extinction dates. (Multiply the
horizontal axis by ¹ to replace ª(t) by k (0).)
While Lemma 2 assumed a > g, that condition is su±cient but not neces-
sary for the proof of the Theorem. Thus, the Theorem holds more generally.
While a > r presents the most interesting class of cases, its complement
contains some canonical cases. Non-renewable resources, for which a = 0, is
the most obvious. As these cases may be analysed using the objects already
developed, the following theorem is easily proved:
Theorem 2. When the Uzawa extraction condition holds:
1. IL is always non-empty.
2. IM is non-empty i® a > r.
3. IH is empty when a · g.
The proof makes use of the following lemma:
Lemma 5. For ª(t) to be strictly quasiconcave, either of the following are
su±cient:
1. a 6= g;




0 100 200 300 400 t




Two ¯nite T's, one in¯nite
Ã¤
Ã¤






























By l'H^ opital's rule, when a = g or r = g, the whole term in which it is
contained is zero. Thus, the stated conditions of the lemma su±ce to ensure
that either the ¯rst or second term of D0 (t) is negative.
If either term is non-zero, the whole expression is strictly negative. This
su±ces for lnª(t) to be strictly concave and, thus, for ª(t) to be strictly
quasiconcave.
The Theorem's second result identi¯es the source of multiple equilibria.
When a · r, there is no incentive to conserve the commons: the complemen-
tarity that leads agents to slow their extraction when a > r in response to an
increased extinction date no longer exists. The third result is also intuitive:
14if the growth rate of extraction exceeds that of the commons, the commons
will eventually be extinguished.
In closing, consider the limit case of ° ! 0, linear extraction costs, so that
extraction costs re°ect only total extraction, rather than the rate of extrac-
tion. This may be interpreted as a situation in which there is a competitive
market for the inputs into a CRS extraction function.
Theorem 3. For generic endowments, k (0), the extinction date, T, goes to
zero with °.
Intuitively, removing convexity from the extraction costs removes a disin-
centive to pace one's own extraction, inducing a rush to deplete the commons.
The result parallels that in Gaudet et al. (2002), in which, once reserves fall
to a critical level, \the extraction contest is so ¯erce that the common is
drained in the instant storage is initiated" when average costs are constant.
Here, ° ! 0 makes both marginal and average costs constant. Unlike Gaudet
et al. (2002), extinction is instantaneous here, rather than occurring after a
period of slower extraction. The di®erence between these results does not
re°ect the di®erence between storage alone and full capital market access:
when ° ! 0 our agents also store their income; they do not borrow against
future income.
4 The commons without capital markets
This section compares equilibria with capital market access to those with-
out such access. This latter environment is the one usually analysed in the
dynamic commons literature.
Without access to capital markets, individuals cannot disentangle their
consumption and e®ort smoothing problems: a single instrument must be
used to solve both smoothing problems. Intertemporal budget constraint 5
is replaced by ci (t) = xi (t); feasibility constraint 2 remains the same. Thus,
agents maximise














dt subject to constraint 2;
where tildes distinguish autarkic variables from those with capital market
access. Maximising produces




®+° for t < ~ T
0 for t ¸ ~ T
)
; (18)
15The constant extraction rate implies ¯nite valuation without further condi-
tions.





®+° for t < ~ T
0 for t ¸ ~ T
)
: (19)
Agents therefore treat the optimisation problem as a static one: the inability
to intertemporally smooth and the absence of strategic interaction eliminates
dynamic aspects from their problem. This, in turn, eliminates the possibility
of strategic complementarities. Extinction dates, in contrast to those derived
in Theorem 1 under capital market access, are unique:
Theorem 4. When agents do not have access to capital markets, there is a







Otherwise, the unique equilibrium has no extinction.
The proof, in the Appendix, shows that ~ T is convex in k (0). Again, the
Uzawa conditions derived earlier are assumed to hold.
Figure 2 displays an example of the e®ect of capital market access on
extinction dates.18 The curve referring to capital market access is that in
Figure 1. Here, low levels of commons stock are preserved for longer by indi-
viduals under autarky. Above k (0) = ¹Ã¤, an intermediate zone is entered.
In this, the autarkic extinction date lies between the two ¯nite extinction
dates with capital market access. At the same time, there is a market access
equilibrium with no extinction.
Finally, above a higher level of k (0), the autarkic extinction date is greater
than both of the ¯nite dates with access. Again, though, there is a non-
extinction equilibrium with capital market access.
Comparing extinction dates does not provide much insight into welfare
comparisons: extinction under autarky ensures no further consumption as
well as extraction; under market access, it merely halts extraction. We there-
fore compare welfare directly.
The equilibrium welfare obtained by the in¯nitesimal agents di under
market access may be expressed in terms of initial extraction, xi (0) by sub-
stitution of equations 8, 11 and 12 into equation 4:


































As T is not generally a function of k (0), this cannot be expressed as a function
of k (0) directly.
The corresponding autarkic welfare obtained by individuals di is:





















The following theorem compares welfare under market access and autarky.
The cases that it presents avoid the problem of multiple equilibria found in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. When







, market access dominates autarky whenever
½ 6= r. When ½ = r, welfare is identical.
2. k (0) < 1
aµ
1
®+° and ® ¸ 1, market access dominates autarky.
3. k (0) ¸ 1
aµ
1
®+°, autarky dominates market access at ° ! 0 i® ½ ¸ r.
174. k (0) < 1
aµ
1
®+° and ® < 1, a necessary condition for autarky to dominate
market access at ° ! 0 is ½ > r. Autarky then dominates i® k (0) lies
above a critical value.







, a su±cient condition for autarky to domi-
nate market access at ® ! 0 is that a > r, ½ not be too much larger




6. ® < 1, market access dominates autarky for small k (0), reaching in-
di®erence at k (0) = 0.
For the ¯rst result, as agents interact exclusively through the ¯nite ex-
tinction date, setting it to in¯nity removes their interaction. Market access
is generally preferred under these circumstances as it enlarges agents' action
space without strategic consequence. When ½ = r, extraction and consump-
tion under market access are not only constant, but equal to that under
autarky. Thus, when the market and subjective discount rates are the same,
intertemporal markets are not used - a pseudo-autarkic equilibrium.
Intuition for the second result is immediate: a ¯nite extinction date and
consumption utility more curved than the logarithmic delivers payo®s of
negative in¯nity beyond extinction.
To understand the third result, recall Theorem 3: ° ! 0 ) T ! 0,
so that no use is made of the high return commons under market access.
Perhaps surprisingly, market access still outperforms autarky when agents
are patient. Although ° ! 0 initially forces a frenzy of extraction, their
patience allows these initial costs to be outweighed by subsequent bene¯ts
of market access. This is not so when they are impatient. Equivalently, in
terms of the interest rate: when r is low, agents earn little on the resources
that they initially extract, leading them to prefer autarky.
The intuition for the fourth result is the same. The condition on ® pre-
vents negative in¯nite payo®s under autarky.
Regarding the ¯fth result, at ® ! 0 and ½ > r (½ < r violates the Uzawa
consumption condition, deferring consumption until t = 1), all consumption
under market access occurs instantly. As to extraction, xi (0) = ~ xi (0), but
the former grows exponentially at rate g for all t · T thereafter, while the
latter remains constant. When ½ = r, then, the extraction paths are identical.
At this limit, the consumption plans under autarky and market access have
the same value: linear utility and equal subjective and market discount rates
mean that the scheduling of consumption is irrelevant. Here, then, agents
are indi®erent between market access and autarky. This is a weaker form of
pseudo-autarky as consumption paths may di®er under the two institutions,
but irrelevantly.
18An increase in ½ has two e®ects on the market access equilibria. First,
and positively, it discounts the (future) extraction costs while leaving the
(present) consumption utility unaltered. Second, negatively when a > r, it
speeds the commons' extinction. As ½ ! (1 + °)r the former e®ect domi-
nates, so that market access, in turn, dominates autarky. For large k (0), the
autarkic ~ T is very large, as illustrated in Figure 2. When ½ just exceeds r,
the latter e®ect dominates: slight impatience substantially speeds extinction.
The relative performance of market access and autarky therefore depends
not just on the magnitude of ½ relative to r but on ® and °. When ° ! 0,
agents are creditors under market access, bene¯tting from high r. When
® ! 0, agents with market access are debtors, bene¯tting from low r.
The more general intuition to draw is that removing one of the agents'
smoothing problems - by setting ® or ° to zero - allows autarky (in which
agents have only a single instrument) to outperform market access (in which
agents determine extraction and consumption plans) under certain condi-
tions. Those conditions depend on whether agents would be net creditors
or debtors under market access. When creditors (° ! 0), high impatience
relative to the interest rate bene¯ts autarky. When debtors (® ! 0), high im-
patience relative to interest rates would discount future repayments, weighing
against autarky.
Results for low values of ® and ° are of greater practical interest, but
involve less tractable calculations. In the extreme case, when ® and ° both
go to zero, market access and autarky yield identical welfare, ¡1
½.
Finally, when zero consumption still delivers ¯nite utility, market ac-
cess dominates autarky when the communal endowment is su±ciently scarce.
Now both technologies quickly deplete the commons, but the former allows
the proceeds to be consumed when desired.
Figure 3 illustrates the Theorem's ¯rst and last results. It perturbs the
parameter values used above very slightly, setting ® = 99
100. This ensures
that welfare under autarky does not drop to ¡1 with ¯nite extinction.19
The Figure also identi¯es a region in which autarky may dominate market
access that the Theorem did not: when ~ T is in¯nite, but market access
yields multiple equilibria autarky is preferred to the market access outcomes
with ¯nite extinction. The mechanism used to select among market access'
multiple equilibria will therefore bias in favour of or against market access.20
19When ® = 1, the graph is largely unchanged, but ~ Wi (k(0)) rises discontinuously from
¡1 at k(0) ¼ 16:5, where ~ T becomes in¯nite.
20While reasoning from global games suggest that the risk dominant market access
equilibria might be selected (Morris and Shin, 2003), the argument is merely suggestive
at present: if, for example, agent i `played' the xi (0) associated with T = 1 when the















Figure 3: Welfare varying in k (0) when ® = 99
100;° = 1;½ = 1




The ¯nal point illustrated by Figure 3 also relates to welfare under market
access. In the region of multiple equilibria, welfare may increase, decrease or
remain constant as the communal endowment increases. Along the highest
branch, T = 1: welfare is insensitive to changes to k (0) as agents do not
regard themselves as constrained. Along the lowest branch, welfare increases
with k (0), an intuitive result. Along the intermediate branch, however, it de-
creases. We identify this as a form of `resource curse' (q.v. Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian, 2003; Bannon and Collier, 2003): higher levels of endowment
support equilibria in which agents correctly expect that they will deplete the
commons more energetically, extinguishing it more quickly. Nevertheless,




We have analysed extraction from a commons when agents have access to
capital markets. Comparison to the standard in the literature, in which
agents do not have such access, shows that the results can di®er signi¯cantly:
multiple equilibria may arise, against unique extinction dates under autarky;
thus, welfare generically di®ers in the two environments.
When communal resources are su±ciently abundant that they would not
be depleted under autarky, the market is preferred for the intertemporal
transfers that it allows. Otherwise, the model identi¯es a number of `risk
factors' that may lead to autarky's superiority. First, autarky performs well
with constant returns to extraction (° ! 0), and impatient agents. Second,
the absence of consumption risk aversion (® ! 0) can also favour autarky.
If CRS extraction and high subjective discount factors are typical of poli-
ties with weak property rights, these conclusions are cautionary. For small
agents, burning fossil fuels to emit into the atmosphere, looting government
facilities or transmission towers for scrap, may seem like CRS activities. On
the other hand, if resource scarcity is their more important characteristic,
market access may o®er substantial improvements over autarky.
Adjudication between these two possibilities requires empirical analysis,
an obvious extension of this work. A good measure of communal endowment,
k (0), should involve both physical and natural capital. Data on the latter
may be especially poor, however, in countries with weak property rights.
A second extension to consider are mechanisms for hardening property
rights. As these involve assigning capital stocks to each agent (with, pre-
sumably, a lower extraction cost from one's own stock), they imply a larger
state space. Even in the commons, analysis of strategic agents generally re-
quires that the state variable include some form of both private savings and
communal endowment.
A policy initiative that can be easily considered in the current framework
is an extraction tax, ±, so that in¯nitesimal agents di retain (1 ¡ ±)x±
i of
their extracted x±
i. Following the interpretation in Tornell and Lane (1999),
tax revenues raised by the state are then contested by parties competing for
the state's resources: thus, tax revenue, ±x±, is returned to the commons,
so that taxes both reduce agents' productivity and replenish the commons.
Rewriting the analysis of Section 3 shows that the tax `in°ates' k (0), delaying
extinction. This and the direct e®ect of the tax both work to reduce initial

























21The direct e®ect of a consumption tax reduces welfare, while the indirect
e®ect through the extinction date increases it. In a market access equilibrium
without extinction, a consumption tax therefore does not improve welfare.21
We conclude by mentioning three further possible extensions. First, gen-
eralising the return to a(k) would be more consistent with both biological
interpretations of the model (q.v. Dockner and Sorger, 1996; Kremer and
Morcom, 2000) and economies of scale. (This could also capture some of
the additional costs of extracting resources as they become scarce.) This
generalisation leaves equation A unchanged but complicates equation I.
Second, allowing the communal endowment to enter directly in instan-
taneous utility (as in Long and Sorger (2006)) also seems more consistent
with biological interpretations of the model: k(t) might provide eco-system
services directly.
Finally, the absence of default provisions is an obvious limitation of the
present analysis.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. When k (0) 2 IL, k (0) ¸ 0 and Ã¤ >
k(0)
¹ . Lemmas 1
and 2 and the continuity of ª(t) ensure that there is a single ¯nite T such
that ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ . By Lemma 3, this implies a unique equilibrium with
¯nite extinction date. As the inequality in Ã¤ is the reverse of the necessary
and su±cient condition in Lemma 4, there are no equilibria with in¯nite
extinction dates.
Now consider k (0) 2 IM ) Ã¤ <
k(0)
¹ < Ã¤. The ¯rst of these ensures,
by Lemma 4, the existence of an equilibrium with an in¯nite extinction date.
For the second inequality to hold, it must be that Ã¤ < Ã¤. By the continuity
of ª(t) and the de¯nition of Ã¤, there are two ¯nite T such that ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ < Ã¤. By Lemma 3, these are equilibria with ¯nite extinction times.




®+° > Ã¤. Thus, by Lemma 3, there are no equilibria
with ¯nite extinction times; by Lemma 4, there is one without extinction.
Now consider the degenerate cases. First, k(0) = kL = kH !
k(0)
¹ =
Ã¤ = Ã¤. By Lemma 3, there is no equilibrium with ¯nite extinction as Ã¤
21A consumption tax, reducing consumption to (1 ¡ ")c"
i, can also considered reason-
ably easily: If the proceeds are returned to the commons equation of motion 1 becomes
more complicated, complicating, in turn, the new version of equation I. Savings taxes or
instruments resembling capital controls are more di±cult to consider. By taxing either
the absolute value of xi (t)¡ci (t) or its positive component, a kink is introduced into the
consumption smoothing problem.
22is only reached as T ! 1. Lemma 4 is satis¯ed with equality, producing an
equilibrium without extinction.
Finally, when kL 6= kH, Lemma 4 is satis¯ed. Now a single ¯nite T
satis¯es Lemma 3, tangentially when k (0) = kH.
Proof of Theorem 2. 1. the continuity of ª(t) and ª(0) = 0 ensure the
result if Ã¤ > 0. When a > g, this has already been demonstrated in








Thus, the Uzawa extraction condition ensures that Ã¤ = 1. Finally,
when a < g;limt!1 Qa¡g (t) = 1; as limt!1 Qr¡g (t);Ã¤ is again in¯-
nite.
2. Su±cient conditions for the existence of IM are that ª0 (t) = 0 for a
¯nite t and that ª(t) be strictly quasiconcave. Consider all possible
cases.














> 08t > 0:
Thus, r > a = g su±ces for an empty IM.


















Thus, a stationary point sets the square bracketed term to zero. Equiv-
alently, it solves
ert ¡ egt










Thus, » (t) is continuous for all t ¸ 0 and, by l'H^ opital's rule, » (0) =
r¡g
a¡g. As this is greater in absolute value than the right hand side of
equation 25 for all ° > 0, a su±cient condition for an empty IM is that




(r ¡ a)e(a+r)t ¡ (r ¡ g)e(r+g)t + (a ¡ g)e(a+g)t
(eat ¡ egt)
2 : (26)
When r > a > g, this is positive.
Now consider r > g > a. By Lemma 5, ª(t) is strictly quasicon-






, a positive ¯nite
number. Its numerator, however, tends to in¯nity. This, by strict qua-
siconcavity, precludes a maximum in ¯nite t. Thus, IM is empty under
these conditions.
Now consider a = r > g. In this case, the square bracketed term in
equation 26 is identically zero, so that »0 (t) = 08t. This su±ces, from
above, for an empty IM.
Finally, consider a > r > g, the case considered above. In this case, the
denominator of » (t) grows more quickly than the numerator, so that
» (t) asymptotes to zero as t ! 1.
3. from the ¯rst steps in the proof, Ã¤ = 1 when a · g. With the Uzawa
extraction condition, this su±ces for an in¯nite Ã¤.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that T is ¯nite. Then, under the stated condi-










This may be rearranged and rewritten in terms of primitives for
k (0)
¹
r + a° ¡ ½









































If T remained positive as ° ! 0 the right hand side of the equation would
converge to unity, generically a contradiction. Thus, ¯nite T ! 0 as ° does.
Now assume that T is in¯nite. Equation A requires x(0) = ¹(r ¡ g)
®
®+°.
By the Uzawa extraction condition, r ¡ g > 0; as ° ! 0, this explodes to
in¯nity, a contradiction for ¯nite k (0).
24Proof of Theorem 4. Substitution of equation 19 into equation of motion 3
yields
e

















®+° ¡ ak (0)
#
: (27)
Thus, as k (0) ! 1
aµ
1
®+°; ~ T approaches in¯nity asymptotically.
Proof of Theorem 5. We prove the results in the order in which they are
stated.
1. the condition ensures that T = ~ T = 1. By equations 20 and 21,






[(1 + °)r ¡ ½]
(®¡1)°





















As ½ is isolated on its left hand side, a necessary condition for the
inequality to hold is that maximising the LHS with respect to ½ does
not cause it to exceed the RHS. The ensuing ¯rst order condition is
(1 + °)®
½ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)r
¡
(1 ¡ ®)°





Equating this to zero for an interior stationary point yields ½ = r,
which satis¯es the Uzawa conditions. The second order condition is
¡
(1 + °)®
[½ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)r]
2 ¡
(1 ¡ ®)°




which, at ½ = r, reduces to
®+°
®°r2 (1 + °)(1 ¡ ®) < 0, a maximum.
Finally, when ½ = r, inequality 29 reduces to an equality.
25When ® > 1 the analysis above holds with the following exceptions:
the sign of inequality 29 is reversed so that minimisation with respect
to ½ is performed; the ¯rst and second order conditions are the same,
but the latter now corresponds to a minimum at ½ = r as ® > 1.
Finally, when ® = 1 (while T = ~ T = 1), welfare expressions 20 and
21 become, by l'H^ opital's rule,
lim
®!1
Wi (k (0)) =
lnµ ¡ 1 ¡ (1 + °)
½¡r

























Di®erentiating the left hand side with respect to ½ < (1 + °)r reveals
a maximum at ½ = r, causing the inequality to hold with equality.
2. the condition on k (0) ensures ¯nite extinction under autarky. That
on ® ensures instantaneous payo®s of ¡1 beyond ~ T. As consumption
is always positive under market access, this is avoided, and the result
follows.
3. by Theorem 3, the condition on ° ensures that T ! 0 so that










































When ® 6= 1 this reduces to r ¸ ½.
When ® = 1;° = 0 may be substituted into expression 30 to de-
scribe autarkic welfare. That under market access is found by applying










264. ~ Wi (k (0)) ¸ Wi (k (0)) is now equivalent to
1 ¸
(1 ¡ ®)(½ ¡ r)












The ¯rst inequality is direct. As the RHS term is positive, a necessary
condition for the inequality to hold is that ½ > r. The LHS is insensitive
to k (0) while the RHS monotonically declines in it. When k (0) = 0,




5. The condition on k (0) ensures that T and ~ T are ¯nite. At ® ! 0;ª(t)
increases monotonically, ensuring a unique extinction date satisfying
k (0) = µ
1
° 1¡e¡(a¡g)T
a¡g . Combined with expression 20 at ® ! 0, welfare
under capital markets is



























Similarly, expression 21 may be rewritten as

































































¡½T¢ (1 + °)°r
[(1 + °)r ¡ ½]
2¡~ Te
¡½ ~ T;
as @ ~ T





































When this term is negative, autarky dominates market access for ½ just




° ¢0 (r) = ¡1.
The limit in k (0) is only appropriate if 1
aµ
1
° · ¹Á¤ when a > r at
® ! 0. As lim®!0 Á¤ = 1
a¡g when a > r and lim®!0 ¹ = µ
1
°, it is.








when ® < 1. Similarly, limk(0)!0 ~ Wi (k (0)) = ¡ 1
(1¡®)½.
To show that market access dominates autarky for small k (0) note that
W 0
i (k (0)) ¸ ~ W 0

























¡½ ~ T d~ T
dk (0)
:
The inequality holds as all terms remain ¯nite and positive as k (0) ! 0
except Qr¡g (T), which converges to 0.
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